Denver Law Review
Volume 90
Issue 5 Symposium - Forty Years since Keyes v.
School District No.1: Equality of Educational
Opportunity and the Legal Construction of
Metropolitan America

Article 9

January 2013

Untoward Consequences: The Ironic Legacy of Keyes v. School
District No. 1
Rachel F. Moran

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Rachel F. Moran, Untoward Consequences: The Ironic Legacy of Keyes v. School District No. 1, 90 Denv. U.
L. Rev. 1209 (2013).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

UNTOWARD CONSEQUENCES:
THE IRONIC LEGACY OF KEYES V. SCHOOL DISTRICT No.
RACHEL F. MORANt
ABSTRACT

The Keyes case began with high hopes that desegregation would
lead to educational equity for black and Latino students in the Denver
Public Schools. The lawsuit made history by successfully using circumstantial evidence to establish intentional discrimination and bring courtordered busing to a school system outside the South. In the intervening
years, that initial success became laden with irony. Because Denver was
a tri-ethnic community of whites, blacks, and Latinos, the litigation revealed the complexities of pursuing reform in a school district not defined by a history of black-white relations.
The courts had to decide whether Latinos would count as white
when measuring racial balance in the Denver schools. This approach was
rejected, but as the demographics of the school district shifted, Latino
students came to dominate the schools. Whatever the formal classification scheme, the children available to introduce diversity into predominantly black schools were mainly Latino. Similarly, the case highlighted
tensions between desegregation and bilingual education when special
programs depended on concentrating English language learners in particular schools. The courts made clear that bilingual education was not a
substitute for desegregation, but when Denver school officials sought to
terminate the desegregation decree, they signed a consent agreement to
provide language programs as evidence of good faith. Long after Denver's public schools reverted to being racially and ethnically identifiable,
these programs persisted. In effect, bilingual education was used to mitigate the impact of educational isolation that followed the close of the
desegregation decree.
The Keyes litigation was protracted and the aims ambitious, but in
the end, the plaintiffs' lofty goals were not realized. In general, graduation rates and achievement test scores for black and Latino students in
the Denver schools still lag behind those of white peers. A series of ret Rachel F. Moran is the Dean and Michael J. Connell Distinguished Professor of Law at
the UCLA School of Law. Dean Moran received her A.B. in Psychology from Stanford University
and her J.D. from Yale Law School. She previously conducted an in-depth study of the Keyes case,
which forms the basis for part of this Article. She is indebted to Anel Loubser, who assisted in
gathering materials to augment the earlier research findings. Dean Moran is grateful to the Denver
University Law Review for inviting her to participate in this important symposium, and she also
appreciates the helpful comments of the editorial staff.
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forms-from merit pay for teachers to new charter schools-have failed
to close the gap. So far, colorblind political initiatives seem as ineffectual
as color-conscious judicial interventions when tackling intractable educational inequalities.
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INTRODUCTION

Now that I am dean of the UCLA School of Law, I regularly meet
with our alumni. Recently, I was in Washington, D.C., for one such
meeting. An alumna was describing some of the federal government's
efforts to bring arts and culture to America's elementary and secondary
schools, and in the course of that conversation, she mentioned a turnaround school in Denver: the Noel Middle School.' I paused for a moment
as my past life as a scholar and my current life as a dean collided. While
a faculty member, I had done extensive research on Keyes v. School District No. 1,2 a lawsuit demanding educational equity for all students in
the Denver Public Schools. A key architect of the effort was Rachel B.
Noel, the first black member of the Denver school board.3 She had pursued integration in the political and judicial arenas as an avenue to enhanced educational achievement and improved relations among blacks,
whites, and Latinos in the district. So, I could not help but be struck by
the fact that her quest for excellence and better intergroup understanding
had been memorialized by attaching her name to a low-performing, segregated school.4 This was the first irony, but it would not be the last as I
embarked on a retrospective of the Keyes case for this symposium.
When I reviewed the history of Keyes and its aftermath, I saw time
and again how the principles that underlay the case had been subverted,
often in ways that produced results antithetical to the reform agenda that
motivated advocates like Rachel Noel. Here, I will briefly recount the
events leading up to the lawsuit, its journey through the courts, and the
key objectives that advocates hoped to attain by suing the district. I will
then conclude by showing how ironic, even tragic, the outcomes of the
1. RACHEL B. NOEL MIDDLE SCH., noel.dpskl 2.org/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2013).
2.
413 U.S. 189 (1973).
3.
Rachel F. Moran, Getting a Foot in the Door: The Hispanic Pushfor Equal Educational
Opportunityin Denver, 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 35, 37 (1992).
4.
See The Tragic Legacy of Rachel B. Noel, OOMS WITH A VIEW (Feb. 8, 2013),
http://oomswithaview.org/2013/02/08/the-tragic-legacy-of-rachel-b-noel/.
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litigation have been. From the outset, the central focus of the litigation
was integration. Though politically unpopular, the judicial mandate was
unambiguous. Rejecting the trial court's initial, limited desegregation
decree, the United States Supreme Court ordered district-wide relief.
Afterwards, when the trial judge sought to preserve some identifiably
Latino schools that could serve special linguistic and cultural needs, the
federal court of appeals made clear that bilingual education was not a
substitute for integration. Nearly a decade later, the school district cemented its commitment to bilingual programs as a way to hasten a declaration that the Denver public school system was unitary and therefore no
longer subject to judicial oversight under the desegregation order. Once
again, bilingual education was offered up as a substitute for desegregation, though it took another decade for the busing decree to come to an
end. Because the language decree remains in place, bilingual programs
have persisted long after the Denver Public Schools reverted to segregated conditions. Neither desegregation nor the language decree has solved
the problems confronting English language learners, who continue to
struggle academically and are among the lowest performing students in
the district.
The lawsuit also rejected any assertion that Latinos could count as
white when desegregating the schools. Latinos were analogized to blacks
based on their shared histories of discrimination and similar shortfalls in
achieving academic success. The desegregation order therefore could not
treat a predominantly black and Latino school as integrated. Yet, due to
white flight and a substantial influx of Latino families, Latinos increasingly became the only group available to integrate predominantly black
schools. Today, schools with black and Latino student bodies are commonplace in Denver.
The Keyes litigation largely ignored the concerns of Latinos who rejected an emphasis on race and instead insisted that economic barriers
were the principal obstacle to full inclusion and high achievement for
their children. Like other pupils in the Denver Public Schools, Latinos
now find themselves in intensified conditions of economic isolation, reflecting in part the white and middle-class flight to the suburbs that took
place in the wake of the Keyes desegregation order. Again, because this
type of economic segregation was missing from the lawsuit's framework,
there has been little effort to consider what pernicious consequences
class segregation may have. Even so, there is evidence that this isolation
correlates with depressed academic performance in the Denver schools,
and at the national level, research suggests that class integration can have
beneficial effects on the educational attainment of low-income students.

5. Richard D. Kahlenberg, From All Walks of Life: New Hope for School Integration, AM.
EDUC., Winter 2012-2013, at 2, 4-6.
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Though Keyes privileged racial concerns above other obstacles to
achieving equal educational opportunity, today the school district is primarily pursuing "colorblind" reforms that focus on school governance:
professional development, merit pay, and new charter, alternative, and
innovation schools. Shortly after the district was declared unitary, a local
African-American attorney filed a lawsuit alleging educational malpractice in the Denver schools. Initially framed in racial terms, the case eventually evolved into a call for structural reforms like vouchers. Nowadays,
the rhetoric of school reform emphasizes changes that will benefit all
children. Though achievement gaps persist, overall performance is so
depressed that everystudent is seen as a potential beneficiary of initiatives to improve the teaching force and expand schooling options.
In short, irony upon irony may be the Keyes case's lasting legacy.
Today, despite decades of struggle, the public schools remain racially
identifiable, and economic segregation arguably has worsened. Of all the
outcomes in the litigation, the commitment to bilingual education has
proven the most durable, largely because its implementation does not
depend on conditions of integration in the schools. So far, the next generation of school governance reforms has not been able to combat conditions of separation and stratification. Sadly, colorblind political solutions
have proven no more effective than color-conscious judicial remedies.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE KEYES CASE
The Keyes case has its roots in demographic change that took place
in Denver in the wake of World War II. Blacks who had served in the
military and been stationed in the city chose to remain there. 6 They were
relatively well educated, affluent, and upwardly mobile, but housing segregation forced them to cluster in the northeast section of Denver. The
public schools in the area soon became overcrowded, which in turn led to
growing dissatisfaction among ambitious African-American parents.
Blacks began to press for reforms that would rectify overcrowded conditions, high dropout rates, and low achievement. Reflecting broader national trends, African Americans in Denver linked educational equity to
school integration.
In response, the Denver school board appointed two blue-ribbon
panels to review the situation and make suitable recommendations. The
panels proposed a voluntary enrollment plan and resolutions to integrate
elementary and secondary schools in certain predominantly African6.
CARL ABBOTT ET AL., COLORADO: A HISTORY OF THE CENTENNIAL STATE 300, 302
(1982). See generally STEPHEN J. LEONARD & THOMAS J. NOEL, DENVER: MINING CAMP TO

METROPOLIS 368, 375-76 (1990).
7.
ABBOTT ET AL., supra note 6, at 299, 302; LEONARD & NOEL, supra note 6, at 374-76.
8.
Rachel F. Moran, Courts and the Construction of Racial and Ethnic Identity: Public Law
Litigation in the Denver Schools, in LEGAL CULTURE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 153, 157 (Law-

rence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1996).
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American and white areas of Denver.9 The voluntary enrollment plan
allowed parents to register their children in schools outside of their
neighborhood if spaces were available and students at the new school
were predominantly of a different race.' 0 This plan met with little resistance, but when the board adopted resolutioris to integrate some black
and white schools through busing, there was significant backlash. Normally, school board meetings were a sedate and sleepy affair, but after
passage of the resolutions, there was a huge public turnout with discussion dominated by emotional pleas for rescission as well as angry threats
of a lawsuit, recalls, and reprisal at the polls."
The Denver electorate did, in fact, express its dissatisfaction at the
ballot box. After a contentious school board election, the voters selected
anti-busing candidates by a 2-1 margin.1 2 These new board members
promptly rescinded the integration resolutions, and shortly thereafter, the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People's Legal
Defense Fund (NAACP LDF) filed suit on behalf of a class of black,
Latino, and white students.'" Rachel Noel had been a principal architect
of the resolutions, and as the school board deliberated about the rescission, she became convinced that it would be necessary to go to court with
the NAACP LDF's help. She saw the lawsuit as a way to vindicate integration as the means to achieving equal educational opportunity.14
Initially, the attorneys in the case considered using Keyes as a vehicle to attack de facto as well as de jure segregation in the schools. 5 Before the Denver suit, the NAACP LDF had focused on Southern school
districts with legally mandated (that is, de jure) segregation. In the North
and West, however, there were less likely to be formal laws requiring
that students attend schools based on their race. Instead, a neighborhood
school policy produced de facto segregation because racially identifiable
schools resulted from segregated housing patterns.' 6 To attack de facto
segregation as a constitutional violation would have been a bold move.
After all, the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence since the

9.
Id.; see also ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EQUAL. OF EDUC. OPPORTUNITY IN THE DENVER
PUB. SCH., FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, SCHOOL
DISTRICT NUMBER ONE, DENVER, COLORADO 15-16 (1967); SPECIAL STUDY COMM. ON EQUAL. OF
EDUC. OPPORTUNITY IN THE DENVER PUB. SCH., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD
OF EDUCATION, SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE, DENVER, COLORADO 1-2 (1964).

10.
LEONARD & NOEL, supra note 6, at 373-78; Interview with Gordon Greiner, Partner,
Holland & Hart LLP, in Denver, Colo. (Sept. 17, 1991).
11.
School Board Takes Historic Step, DENVER POST, Feb. 2, 1969, at G3.
12.
Charles Carter, Perrill, Southworth Win; City Pay Raises Okayed, DENVER POST, May 21,
1969, at 1,23.
13.
Charles Carter, Forced Busing Plan Killed: "Voluntary" Program OK'd-New Board
Votes 4-3for Changes, DENVER POST, Mar. 19, 1967, at 3.
14.
Interview with Rachel Noel, Former Member, Denver Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., in Denver,
Colo. (Oct. 8, 1991).
15.
Moran, supra note 8, at 158.
16.

Moran, supra note 3, at 35.
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landmark 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education" had consistently turned on openly discriminatory state and local laws, not just a disparate set of racial results. 18 Were the NAACP LDF to attack de facto
segregation and prevail, every school district in the country would be
required to integrate, even in the absence of past intentional wrongdoing
by school officials. The judiciary could potentially wind up overseeing
school systems throughout the country, and the accusation that the courts
were acting as "super school boards" would then have some genuine
force.' 9
In the end, the NAACP LDF decided to adopt a less dramatic strategy, instead relying on circumstantial evidence (as opposed to formal
statutes, rules, or regulations) to establish that the Denver school board
had made decisions about attendance boundaries, sites for school construction, and teacher assignments based on discriminatory motives. In
particular, the plaintiffs showed that attendance zones, sites for new
schools, and teacher assignments were heavily influenced by the racial
make-up of neighborhoods. 20 Attendance zones shifted block by block as
African Americans moved into a residential area. Schools were built at
the center of black or white neighborhoods rather than at the periphery,
where integration might take place in transitional areas. White teachers
were assigned to predominantly white schools, while black teachers were
assigned to predominantly black ones. 2 1 Based on this evidence, the
plaintiffs argued that the school board had manipulated the neighborhood
school policy to perpetuate segregation. After seeing the statistical findings put together by the plaintiffs, Judge William Doyle, the federal district court judge who presided over the trial, remarked that "this [case]
has been a revelation to me." 22
Relying on the plaintiffs' showing, the judge ordered desegregation
of black schools concentrated in northeast Denver and nearby white
schools. This order left predominantly Latino schools in other parts of
the city largely untouched, a decision that reflected local politics. 2 3 The
plaintiff class in Keyes nominally included whites and Latinos as well as
blacks, but in truth, Latinos and whites alike were generally unsupportive
of the integration efforts, and Latinos preferred that that their children
attend neighborhood schools that would be responsive to distinct linguis17.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18.
See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1970); Green v.
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
19.

See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES 140-42

(1996) (describing the internal debate over the de jure-de facto distinction when the United States
Supreme Court reviewed the Keyes case and the attendant concerns about the remedial implications
of ballasting the distinction).
20.
Moran, supranote 3, at 35.
21.
Moran, supranote 8, at 158.
22.
Id (quoting Transcript of Record at 765, Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61 (D.
Colo. 1970) (No. C-1499))
23.
Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 83-84.
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tic and cultural needs.24 Moreover, blacks and Latmios had not forged
political coalitions in support of an integrationist agenda, school reform,
or municipal reform.25 As Dr. Richard Koeppe, a former superintendent
of the Denver Public Schools, observed: "[T]he Hispanic community
lives over here and does their thing, and the black community lives over
here...."2 6 Given these realities, Judge Doyle crafted his initial order to
vindicate an integrationist ideal without unduly disrupting intergroup
relations in the tri-ethnic district.
All of Judge Doyle's efforts to calibrate the order in a politically
palatable way were upset on appeal. Convinced that the district court
could not legitimately find discriminatory intent based on the circumstantial case before it, the school board appealed the decision.27 Instead
of prevailing, the board found itself subject to a far more onerous remedial order. Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
adopted an approach even narrower than that crafted by Judge Doyle, the
United States Supreme Court ultimately ordered district-wide relief.2 1 In
an opinion by Justice William Brennan, the majority of the Court concluded that the plaintiffs showing of discriminatory motive in one area
of the district created a presumption that the entire school system was
affected. 29 As a consequence, the desegregation remedy had to cover the
whole district and not just the subset of schools identified by either Judge
Doyle or the Tenth Circuit.30
On remand, it became clear that every neighborhood in Denver
would be required to participate in the desegregation effort.' At this
point, the Latino community, which had previously expressed doubts
about the utility of integration as a cure for educational inequity, became
actively engaged in the case. 3 2 Many members of the Latino community
had longstanding roots in Denver. Latinos on average were less well educated and less affluent than the blacks who had arrived in the city after
World War II.33 Before the lawsuit, in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
24.
Moran, supranote 8, at 158-59.
25.
James J. Fishman & Lawrence Strauss, Endless Journey: Integrationand the Provisionof
Equal Educational Opportunity in Denver Public Schools; A Study of Keyes v. School District
No. 1, 32 How. L.J. 627, 634 (1989).
26.
Interview with Dr. Richard Koeppe, Former Superintendent, Denver Pub. Sch., in Denver,
Colo. (Oct. 7, 1991).
27.
Moran, supra note 8, at 159.
28.
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), modified and remanded, 413
U.S. 189 (1973).
29. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 201-03.
30. Id. at 204-13.
31.
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 368 F. Supp. 207, 208-10 (D. Colo. 1973).
32.
Motion to Intervene as Parties Plaintiffs at 3, Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465
(10th Cir. 1975) (No. C-1499), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/not_public/SDCO-0001 -0001 .pdf; Moran, supranote 8, at 160.
33.
ABBOTT ET AL., supra note 6, at 302-03; LEONARD & NOEL, supra note 6, at 389-90;
Jessica Pearson & Jeffirey Pearson, The Denver Case: Keyes v. School District No. 1, in LIMITS OF
JUSTICE: THE COURTS' ROLE IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 168, 169 (Howard I. Kalodner & James J.
Fishman eds., 1978).
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Latio activists led by a charismatic ex-boxer named Corky Gonzales
had espoused an ethnic pride agenda that rejected desegregation, 34 and
moderate and conservative Latinos also expressed their opposition to
desegregation. As Bernard Valdez, a member of the school board, put it:
"I felt all along that desegregation was not going to improve education,
because I just couldn't see how it would.... I thought it might improve
the human relations aspect ... when children get to know each other and
things of that nature. But my mind never changed. I always maintained
that the busing and the mixing of children didn't do anything for the educational achievement of children."35
Regardless of political ideology, then, Latinos showed little interest
in school integration. When it became clear that a busing decree would
include predominantly Latino schools, the Congress of Hispanic Educators, a group of Latino teachers and school administrators, intervened to
exempt some schools so that they could promote bilingual and cultural
education. 36 Although Judge Doyle was sympathetic and granted a limited number of exceptions, 37 the Tenth Circuit was not favorably disposed and made clear that "[b]ilingual education ... is not a substitute
for desegregation." 3 8 On remand, the trial court made the busing order
comprehensive.
When the decree was implemented, many white and middle-class
families sought refuge in the suburbs. However, there was a problem.
Historically, the Denver school system could annex contiguous areas by
a majority vote of its own population. 3 9 The voters in the annexed area
had no voice in the process. The Poundstone Amendment quickly eliminated this obstacle to white flight. The new provision required that both
Denverites and residents of the neighborhood to be annexed approve the
consolidation.40 With white flight now a viable option, families increasingly chose to leave the city. 41 Nolan Winsett, a leader of Citizens Association for Neighborhood Schools, an organization that vigorously opposed busing, described the exodus this way:
[A]s it turns out, all we did was to stage an action with the federal
court ruling right over us, allowing the populace sufficient time to be
orderly, quietly evacuated. And did they evacuate! They hit the coun34.
Calvin Trillin, U.S. Journal: Denver, NEW YORKER, May 31, 1969, at 85, 88; Moran,
supra note 3, at 38.
35.
Interview with Bernard Valdez, Former Member, Denver Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., in
Denver, Colo. (Oct. 1, 1991).
36.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
37.
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 380 F. Supp. 673, 692, 696 (D. Colo. 1974).
38.

Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465, 480 (10th Cir. 1975).
DALE A. OESTERLE & RICHARD B. COLLINS, THE COLORADO STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 391 (2002).

39.

40.

Id.

41.
CHUNGMEI LEE, HARVARD C.R. PROJECT, DENVER PUBLIC SCHOOLS: RESEGREGATION,
LATINO STYLE 3 (2006); Moran, supra note 8, at 164.
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ty lines so fast, north, south, east and west, that it absolutely blew the
minds of developers. 42
In the 1980s and 1990s, the school district began to argue that it was
no longer possible to achieve meaningful desegregation because of demographic shifts in Denver neighborhoods. School officials contended
that the district court should declare that the lingering effects of segregation had been cured and that the district therefore was unitary. This
would mean that the busing order would draw to a close and that judicial
oversight would come to an end.43 By this time, Judge Richard P. Matsch
was in charge of the case." In demonstrating the district's bona fides and
good faith, school officials relied on evidence of a strong conmitment to
bilingual and bicultural programs. This conciliatory tone was designed to
show that any animus was a thing of the past and that current board
members could be relied upon to be fair and impartial decision makers in
matters of race and ethnicity. 45 These efforts led to an order addressing
the necessary elements of a bilingual program in August 1984. 46 The
order emphasized transitional bilingual education programs that use a
child's native language as a bridge to learning English, rather than immersion programs that rely on comprehensive exposure to English with
little use of the native language.47 Interestingly, the agreement was
reached at a point when the national commitment to using a child's native language was waning.4 8 So, the initiative seemed to grow out of a
desire to end court-ordered desegregation, rather than as a response to
49
growing demands for special bilingual programs.
Although efforts to end the busing order did not at first succeed, the
school district was finally declared unitary in September 1995.50 Because
of ongoing demographic shifts in the Denver Public Schools, many believed that busing was an increasingly costly remedy with steadily declining benefits. The court's desegregation order simply could not over42. Interview with Nolan Winsett, Former President, Citizens Ass'n for Neighborhood Sch.,
in Denver, Colo. (Oct. 1, 1991).
43. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 895 F.2d 659, 661-62 (10th Cir. 1990); Moran, supra note
8, at 160-61.
44. Judge Doyle had been appointed to the Tenth Circuit in 1971 but continued to preside
over the Keyes case. He assumed senior status in 1984 and died in 1986. U.S. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE COMM. ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S., THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT: A HISTORY 415, 460 (1992); In Memoriam to the Honorable William E. Doyle, 1911-1986, 64 DENV. U. L. REV. 101, 102 (1987).
45.
Moran, supra note 8, at 160; Fishman & Strauss, supra note 25, at 702-03.
See DENVER PUB. SCH., REPORT TO THE BOARD OF EDUCATION: A PROGRAM FOR
46.
available
at
(1984),
STUDENTS
14-27
PROFICIENT
LIMITED
ENGLISH
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDoes/public/ED-CO-0001 -0017.pdf.
47.
Id; Moran, supra note 3, at 39.
48.
Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Conflict, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 321, 330-

33 (1987); Rachel F. Moran, The PoliticsofDiscretion: FederalIntervention in Bilingual Education,
76 CALIF. L. REV. 1249, 1298-1314 (1988).
49.
Moran, supra note 3, at 39.
50.
Keyes v. Cong. of Hispanic Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274, 1307-08 (D. Colo. 1995),
appeal dismissed, 119 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997).
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come the fact that whites had become a distinct minority in the district.
Many educators worried that busing damaged their ability to engage parents in the life of the schools. Teachers and administrators also believed
that compliance with the decree diverted the school district from other
reform initiatives that might enhance the quality of the educational expe*51
rience."
With people of color in the majority, there was a growing sense that
the political process was an appropriate outlet for pursuing school reforms. As Judge Matsch noted: "The Denver now before this court is
very different from what it was when this lawsuit began.... People of
color are not bystanders. They are active players in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the community. . . . There is little danger

that they will permit the public schools to deny them full participation." 52
As evidence of the viability of political solutions, officials were implementing collaborative decision making to create enhanced opportunities
for participation in school governance for parents and community members. With the end of busing, Denver's public schools could once again
be neighborhood schools.
Although neighborhood schools would likely revert to being racially and ethnically identifiable, leading politicians did not necessarily view
this as a problem. After years of living under the Keyes desegregation
order, local leaders believed that prejudice in Denver had declined significantly.54 As a result, they treated choices to live in segregated neighborhoods as the product of legitimate personal choice rather than of racism.
For example, Assistant City Attorney Stan Sharoff described the views
of Wellington Webb, Denver's first black mayor, as follows:
[E]ven in situations where the price of the housing stock is not a factor, the Mayor chooses to live in a black area of Denver. He doesn't
want to live in southeast Denver where the majority of people are
Anglo.... [The Mayor and other prominent black officials] can afford to live in other areas, but [they] like living in the black community. And this is true with Hispanic people, too, according to the people I've talked to. So, we don't expect a random distribution [of racial and ethnic groups across neighborhoods]. We expect people to
live in areas where they want to live. . . . [Concentration of Hispanics
in west Denver is] consistent with what the Mayor believes are peo-

51.
Patrick James McQuillan & Kerry Suzanne Englert, The Return to Neighborhood Schools,
ConcentratedPoverty, and EducationalOpportunity:An Agenda for Reform, 28 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 739, 742-45 (2001).
52.
Keyes, 902 F. Supp. at 1307.
53.
JUDY BRAY & ALEX MEDLER, DENVER'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS: REFORMS, CHALLENGES,
AND THE FUTURE 5 (2009).

54.

Moran, supra note 8, at 167.
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ple's voluntary choices, that it isn't the forces of discrimination that
are dictating where Hispanics live.55
As a result, the emerging multiracial coalition of politicians in Denver
was not necessarily committed to preserving Keyes's legacy or pursuing
an agenda that focused on race and ethnicity as the basis for school reform.
The school district had supported bilingual programs as a means to
advance its claim that the busing decree should end, but the strength of
the commitment to language programs was tested at the time that the
district was finally declared unitary. When the court entered the unitariness order in 1995, the school district filed a motion to modify the August 1984 language rights order. The Congress of Hispanic Educators
responded, and the United States also participated in the status conferences that ensued. The parties agreed to a new English Language Acquisition Program (ELAP) over the objections of Padres Unidos, a group of
parents of Denver students. 6 ELAP set forth a detailed blueprint for the
identification and assessment of English language learners, the models of
instruction, the notification and consent of parents to the placement of
English language learners, and the evaluation and exit of students from
the programs. Under ELAP, schools would offer English as a Second
Language programs except where there were 60 or more Spanishspeaking students in an elementary school, 75 or more in a middle
school, or 200 or more in a high school who desired a program that made
use of the native language as a bridge to learning English. 8 The judge
closed the case as an administrative matter, retaining jurisdiction to receive monitoring reports and to review any resulting compliance issues. 59
II. THE

IRONIES OF THE KEYES

CASE

Now that the school district has been unitary for over seventeen
years, it is possible to reflect on the successes and failures of the lawsuit.
The litigation did not achieve its integrationist vision for the Denver
schools. Even while the decree was in place, demographic shifts put this
goal largely out of reach, and afterwards, the reversion to a neighborhood
school policy intensified segregation.60 During the Keyes litigation and in
55.
Interview with Stan Sharoff, Former Ass't City Att'y, Denver City Attorney's Off., in
Denver, Colo. (Oct. 10, 1991).
Mike Fagan, Case Profile: Cong. offHispanic Educators v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, U. MICH. L.
56.
SCH.

C.R.

LITIG.

CLEARINGHOUSE

(June

17,

2008),

http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.phpid=9480.
57.
Order Approving English Acquisition Program, No. 95-M-2313 (D. Colo. June 16, 1999),
availableat http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/ED-CO-0001 -0007.pdf.
58.
Id. at 27, 34, 41.
59.
Fagan, supra note 56.
60.
LEE, supra note 41, at 18; see also CATHERINE L. HORN & MICHAL KURLAENDER,
HARVARD C.R. PROJECT, THE END OF KEYES-RESEGREGATION AND ACHIEVEMENT IN DENVER
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 7-9 (2006).
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the years following, the proportion of white students in the school system
steadily declined, while the proportion of Latino students rose substantially. In 1967, shortly before the Keyes case was filed, the Denver Public
Schools had a student body that was 66% white, 14% black, and 20%
Latino.6 1 In 1994, the year before the district was declared unitary,
whites accounted for 29% of the school population; blacks, 21%; Latinos, 45%; and Asians, 4%.62 By 2003, whites represented only 20% of
the student body; blacks, 19%; Latinos, 57%; and Asians, 3%.63 As these
data suggest, white flight was only part of the story of Denver's transformation; a significant and continuing influx of Latino students was
another important element of the changes in enrollments. 4 Even so,
these demographic shifts cannot completely account for the increased
school segregation that occurred in the wake of the unitariness decision.
The return to a neighborhood school policy also played a part. Whites
became less integrated with non-white students, and many schools also
became more identifiable as black or Latino schools. 65 Latino students
grew especially isolated in the Denver schools; by 2003, the average
Latino attended a school with a student body that was 71% Latino, even
though Latinos made up only 57% of the overall school district population. 66
In addition, these demographic changes correlated with an intensification of socioeconomic isolation. White flight drained the district of
middle-class families, and newly arrived Latino families tended to be
less affluent.6 7 As a result, schools with low white enrollments were increasingly segregated by socioeconomic status: the fewer the number of
white students in a school, the larger the percentage of students eligible
for free and reduced lunches.68 Socioeconomic segregation in turn correlated with academic achievement: the smaller the number of white students in a school, the more depressed the overall scores on standardized
achievement tests.69 The impact of these new patterns of socioeconomic
isolation had differential effects on racial and ethnic subgroups.
Achievement scores for white students were not affected by shifts in
white enrollments after the end of busing. For black and Latino students,
however, average achievement scores increased in schools with gains in
white enrollments, while average scores declined in schools with sub-

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

LEE, supra note 41, at 10.
Id
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 12-13.
Id at 10.
See BRAY & MEDLER, supra note 53, at 4.

68.

HORN & KURLAENDER, supranote 60, at 11-12.

69.

See id. at 16, 19.
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stantial decreases in white enrollments, although the pattern was not entirely consistent. 0
The Keyes case in general was not a panacea for problems of poor
academic performance in the Denver schools. By all measures, academic
achievement in the Denver schools remains depressed. According to a
study by the U.S. Department of Education done in 2004-2005, the city's
average high school graduation rates ranked in the bottom third in the
nation.71 Denver's rates also fell notably below those of comparable
school districts like Aurora, Greeley, and Pueblo, each of which has
similar student demographics. 72 Latino students in Denver fared especially poorly. In 2008, the overall graduation rate was 48.6%, but for Latinos
the rate was 40.5%, while for blacks it was 55.7%, and for whites, it was
61 .0%.73 (For comparison purposes, the statewide graduation rate was
73.9%, while for Latinos it was 55.6%; for blacks, 64.1%; and for
whites, 81.6%. ) Denver lags behind much of the state on standardized
achievement tests, too. Overall, in 2008, fewer than half of the students
in the Denver Public Schools were proficient in reading for grades 3
through 10, and only one-third were proficient in math.15 Once again,
there was an achievement gap with whites outperforming their black and
Latino peers. 76 And, we
when a child failed to score at the proficient level,
the odds were very low that he or she would catch up later.77 These poor
results on achievement tests translated into negative evaluations of Denver's public schools: nearly two-thirds ranked in the low or unsatisfactory categories in Colorado's school accountability reports in 2008. In fact,
five of twelve unsatisfactory schools in the state were located in DenV.78
7
ver.
The most lasting legacy of the case may therefore be the ongoing
commitment to bilingual programs. The language decree remains in
place and may have insulated the city from some of the state politics
surrounding bilingual education. Although Colorado passed an official
English initiative in 1988, the decree remained in force. 79 Later, in 1988,
2000, and 2002 when California, Arizona, and Massachusetts respectively adopted popular measures that mandated structured English immersion
for English language learners, Colorado went a different way. In 2002,

Id. at 23.
70.
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BRAY & MEDLER, supra note 53, at 10.
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Colorado voters rejected such a ballot initiative by a narrow margin.80 It
seems quite possible that the fact that most English language learners in
the state reside in Denver may have played a role in the outcome. After
all, the initiative would have had no impact on those students because it
could not override a federal court order. As a result, much of the force of
the measure was undermined.
That said, it is not clear that the bilingual program's goals of remedying barriers to educational access and attainment have been realized.
After the Denver school district was declared unitary, English language
acquisition programs were clustered in schools marked by poverty as
well as by racial and ethnic isolation. According to data collected in the
1997-1998 and 1998-1999 academic years, the five high schools with
programs for English language learners served student bodies with the
highest percentages eligible for free and reduced lunches, the highest
rates of student turnover, the lowest rates of attendance, the highest
dropout rates, and the lowest levels of academic achievement.8 i Years
after implementation of the 1999 decree, English language learners still
have some of the lowest achievement scores in the district. In the period
from 2003 to 2008, only one in seven of these students scored at a proficient level in reading, and fewer than 20% were proficient in math. 82 Yet,
a 2008 update found that no reports on the court-ordered English Language Acquisition Program had been filed since 2005, suggesting that
monitoring had become perfunctory, if it took place at all. 3
In sum, the Denver Public Schools today are plagued by patterns of
segregation and low achievement, the very kind of patterns that prompted the Keyes case. In addition, the divide may be more entrenched than
ever because of a declining proportion of white students, newly intensified socioeconomic isolation, and a growing population of Latino students from low-income backgrounds. With court-ordered desegregation
largely a thing of the past, the critical question is what the Denver Public
Schools will do for an encore when it comes to educational reform.
III. AFTER KEYES: THE FUTURE OF EDUCATIONAL EQUITY IN DENVER
If Keyes relied on race-based reforms in the courts, the Denver
school district increasingly has turned to race-neutral political remedies.

At first, there was some interest in seeking further judicial intervention.
Shortly after the unitariness decision, an African-American lawyer
named Joe Rogers filed suit in state court, alleging breach of contract and
educational malpractice by the Denver Public Schools. 84 Originally, the
Kathy Escamilla et al., Breaking the Code: Colorado's Defeat of the Anti-bilingual Edu80.
cation Initiative (Amendment 31), 27 BILINGUAL RES. J. 357, 358 (2003).
81.
McQuillan & Englert, supranote 51, at 748-51.
82.
BRAY & MEDLER, supra note 53, at 13, 15.
83.
Fagan, supranote 56.
84.
David Hill & Tom Travis, Class Action, 9 TCHR. MAG. 20, 20, 23, 25-26 (1998).
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case was a class action brought on behalf of black parents and their children, but later the case was expanded to include whites and Latinos.8 5
The lawsuit demanded a number of remedies, including the use of standardized testing to measure student progress and to prepare report cards
on school performance; increased use of charter schools and alternative
schools; elimination of the practice of transferring low-performing teachers to other schools in the district; and implementation of a voucher system.86 The call for vouchers was highly controversial, but one of Rogers's supporters explained: "Vouchers will allow parents to take their
children out of a very bad system. Some will choose to stay incarcerated-and maybe the system serves their purposes. But others are trying
desperately to find something better."" In the wake of decades of court
oversight, a stronger indictment of the Denver schools could hardly be
imagined. Ironically, the imagery of escape echoed the rhetoric of white
flight-busing would undermine the schools, and so parents had to flee a
failing system. Those left behind were portrayed as little more than captives.
Despite the claim that judicial intervention was essential to free
trapped children from underperforming schools, the state courts declined
to get involved. 8 In rejecting the case, state jurists agreed with Judge
Matsch that the political process could now be trusted to effect school
reforms. The trial court found that the "concern and frustration with the
quality of the Denver Public Schools, while understandable, is not
properly a matter for resolution through the court system."89 The court of
appeals added:
Plaintiffs cannot hold a public school district to the implementation of its educational objectives in a judicial setting. This matter is
of a political nature, inasmuch as the school district is a political entity and, therefore, such policy issues should be addressed at the ballot
90
box, not presented as a judicially enforceable contract claim.
In 2001, two academic commentators, Patrick James McQuillan and
Suzanne Englert, called on public officials to address conditions of concentrated poverty in the Denver school system. Acknowledging that
courts were less committed to racial integration than previously had been
the case, the authors suggested that advocates press for a fundamental
right to education that would recognize that schools serving less affluent
students require enhanced funding to provide an equal educational op-

85.
Id.
86. Id. at 26.
87. Id at 26 (quoting Tom Tancredo, former U.S. Representative and U.S. Department of
Education appointee)
88.
Denver Parents Ass'n v. Denver Bd. of Educ., 10 P.3d 662, 663 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
89. Id. at 664.
90. Id at 665.
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portunity.9 1 McQuillan and Englert cautioned, however, that "we realize
that redistributing resources will be difficult, in part, because the communities served by the neediest schools (i.e., low-income, minority populations) have historically been the most politically uninvolved and disenfranchised."9 2 Their analysis called into question the viability of the political process as an avenue for reform for low-income families. For disadvantaged students and their parents, poverty might be a significant
obstacle to advocacy, even if non-whites were a numerical majority in
the school district.
McQuillan and Englert therefore directed their arguments at the judiciary. Their approach did not depend on socioeconomic integration but
instead presumed that concentrated poverty would persist in the schools.
Even so, each school would offer at least an adequate education, if not an
equal educational opportunity. In fact, the State of Colorado has continued to struggle with problems of school finance reform in the years since
the Denver district was declared unitary. Most recently, in Lobato v.
State,93 a Colorado district court concluded that the state's system of
school finance had become irrational and arbitrary because of a failure to
augment per-pupil funding to keep up with the rising costs of education. 94 Some of those costs related to shifting demographics that required
schools to serve students with greater needs due to poverty, language,
and disability.9 5 The district court ordered that the Colorado legislature
take steps in the 2012 legislative term to rectify the failure to provide an
adequate education to all Colorado public school students. 9 6 The State
appealed the decision, and the Colorado Supreme Court subsequently
overturned the district court decision, finding that the school finance
system was rationally related to the constitutional mandate that education
be "thorough and uniform" and that solutions to underfunding lay with
the state legislature.97
Another way to attack conditions of concentrated poverty in the
Denver schools would be to pursue a program of socioeconomic integration. As court-ordered desegregation draws to a close in school districts
around the nation, there has been a growing interest in alternative approaches to overcome isolation based on race and poverty.98 The focus
on socioeconomic plans intensified when the United States Supreme
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

McQuillan & Englert, supranote 51, at 757-59.
Id. at 760.
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Id. at 181.
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Court struck down voluntary integration programs that relied on race in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1.99 Efforts to promote socioeconomic integration have not gained
much traction in the Denver Public Schools, even as the isolation of students from low-income families has deepened. Such plans would have to
be adopted by the school board, rather than pursued through a lawsuit.
Because socioeconomic status is not a protected constitutional category,
no student can assert a right to go to school with people from varied class
backgrounds. At the same time, however, legislatures and agencies enjoy
considerable leeway in addressing socioeconomic differences; there are
no significant constitutional obstacles to implementing socioeconomic
integration plans.100 Even so, there seems to be little political appetite for
another experiment with busing in Denver. Keyes remains an abject reminder that disgruntled parents with resources at their disposal can vote
with their feet when they disagree with a proposed reform. The desegregation order prompted not just white flight, but middle-class flight, and
based on experiences in other districts, school officials may be justifiably
concerned that even more affluent families will flee if their children are
required to attend socioeconomically integrated schools. 0 1
Denver officials have largely resigned themselves to the reality that
public schools will remain segregated by race, ethnicity, and class. As a
result, administrators have focused on enhancing the quality of the educational experience, primarily through reforms that focus on school management and governance. These movements have been couched in universal terms-as a way to improve achievement for all students-rather
than as a response to the needs of particular student subgroups.102 None
of the major efforts is framed in the language of civil rights, and indeed,
the rhetoric of reform is largely "colorblind." There are three key initiatives underway: the Denver Plan, ProComp, and a New Schools, Performance and Innovation initiative. 0 3 The school board adopted the Denver
Plan in 2006 to improve instruction and to cultivate a climate of
achievement. 104 This effort reflects nationwide interest in holding schools
accountable based on rigorous achievement testing. The Denver Plan
uses measures of student performance on standardized tests to create a
scorecard for every school, which in turn serves as the basis for evalua-

99. 551 U.S. 701 (2007); see also Kahlenberg, supra note 5, at 7, 11 (noting trend and describing experience of Louisville, Kentucky school district when its voluntary plan was found unconstitutional in Parents Involved).
100.
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tion and decision making. 05 In addition, the plan uses professional development opportunities to enhance the ability of teachers to deliver
high-quality instruction and to foster leadership skills among principals
and assistant principals.' 06 Finally, the plan seeks to promote collaborations with parents, adult mentors, and community organizations to offer a
safe, orderly, and enriched environment in every school. Initial results
indicated that the plan had achieved some success in improving student
achievement, but much work remained to be done.10 7 In 2010, the plan
was revamped and strengthened to address low overall rates of proficiency in the district and an ongoing racial achievement gap.'os
With the adoption of ProComp, the Denver Public Schools became
an acknowledged leader in the use of performance pay for teachers. 09 In
nearly all school systems around the country, teachers receive salaries
that reflect their level of education and years of experience, even though
neither of these factors correlates with student learning.110 The ProComp
program was the product of a long and careful collaboration. From 1999
to 2003, the school district and the Denver Classroom Teachers Association cooperated in piloting a pay-for-performance plan at sixteen public
schools. Under the plan, teachers worked with principals to set objectives
that would be the basis for determining their compensation."' A study of
the experiment found that it had produced promising results for elevating
teachers' expectations and students' performance. In particular, researchers determined that the more ambitious the teacher's goals, the greater
the improvement in student achievement."12 In 2003-2004, a joint task
force of the Denver Public Schools and the Denver Classroom Teachers
Association recommended that the pilot plan be expanded. Existing
teachers would have the option to join ProComp and be paid based on
performance or to remain under the traditional system of compensation.
All new hires after 2006-2007 would be included in ProComp. 113 By
2008, almost two-thirds of the teachers in the district were part of the
pay-for-performance system, and in 2011, 80% were participating.1 14 To
finance the new approach, Denver voters approved a tax that would gen-
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erate an additional $25 million per year for teacher compensation."' Initial results based on a 2008 study suggested that there was at most a
modest and not entirely consistent correlation with improved student test
scores.116 A later study released in 2011 concluded that ProComp had
produced some success in boosting test scores and assisting with teacher
retention in the school district.' 17
Various obstacles may limit the impact of this pay-for-performance
reform. For one thing, Denver-like many other districts in the stateremains reluctant to weed out bad teachers by labeling them "unsatisfactory.""' In addition, the pension system may constrain the resources
available to reward new teachers early in their careers as a way to reduce
attrition. 1 9 In 2009, even with the adoption of ProComp, about half of all
teachers in the Denver schools left the profession within five years of
starting their jobs.120 In order to provide additional incentives for new
teachers to stay in the district, the Denver Public Schools worked with
the University of Denver and Denver-based Janus Capital Group to create the Denver Teacher Residency Program. Modeled on a medical residency, the program allows up to 100 individuals to teach while obtaining
a master's degree in education. 12 1 In the first year, the participants are
assigned to work with a master teacher in one of five elementary schools.
After that, each teacher begins working full-time in the district, and if the
teacher remains for five years, the tuition for the master's degree is fully
reimbursed.122 The program remains too new to evaluate the results with
any confidence, but it is yet another innovation aimed at improving education for all students in the school system.
The final major area of reform is the New Schools, Performance
and Innovation initiative, which the board adopted in 2007.123 This effort
builds on a statewide commitment to school choice. Colorado was one of
the first to pass a charter school law, which provides public funding for
start-up schools that enjoy considerable autonomy in selecting teachers,
developing a curriculum, and managing the delivery of services.124 Denver had already witnessed a steady growth in the number of charter
schools and in their enrollments before the board adopted the 2007 plan.
In 2000, fewer than 4% of the city's schools were charters, and only
115.
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about 2% of students attended them. By 2006, more than 12% of Denver
schools were charters, and over 8% of students attended one of them. 125
The New Schools, Performance and Innovation initiative is designed to encourage greater school choice by supporting the creation of
new charter schools as well as other alternatives like innovation schools,
which are district-managed institutions that promote innovative practices
and greater autonomy to improve student outcomes. 12 6 The plan was designed to promote the development of high-quality school offerings, especially at the secondary level, and to create an orderly way of closing
failing schools.12 7 In undertaking these reforms, the Denver school system hoped to staunch attrition in enrollments resulting from a policy that
allows students to register across district boundaries.128 In addition,
school officials hoped to lure students into Denver's public schools and
away from private schools, home schooling, and nearby schools in other
districts. The steady growth in the number of charter schools and the
proportion of students they enroll indicate that school choice has an inherent appeal, though the impact on achievement remains uncertain.12 9 In
many ways, the plan reflects the vision of school choice that Joe Rogers
embraced in the lawsuit he filed shortly after the Denver school system
was declared unitary. Yet, this plan is the product of the political rather
than the judicial process, and it is framed as a colorblind effort to promote educational quality and to empower parents to exercise the freedom
to make informed decisions about their children's education.
The current state of the school reform movement in Denver reveals
what may be the Keyes case's ultimate irony. At the inception, litigators
considered making the lawsuit a test case for the proposition that de jure
and de facto school segregation were equally pernicious. Although that
strategy ultimately was dropped, today the very notion of equating these
two types of racial and ethnic isolation has largely disappeared from the
political discourse. Denverites seem to take as a given that their schools
will be segregated, and indeed, leaders frame these conditions as an outgrowth of legitimate private preferences about where to live. Because
conditions of racial and ethnic separation have been naturalized and even
normalized, reform efforts now focus on quality education in classrooms
largely devoid of diversity and often marked by concentrated poverty.
CONCLUSION

Keyes was an extraordinary moment in the history of the Denver
Public Schools. The push for change was driven by local activism, and
the reform agenda was defined by the normative imperative of eradicat125.
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ing racial discrimination. There was a presumption that curing the wrong
of intentional discrimination would lead to improved school performance
for black and Latino students. Instead, after Keyes, public schools in
Denver remain racially and ethnically identifiable, and the achievement
gap persists. Despite ongoing racial disparities, reformers today pursue a
colorblind reform agenda. With segregated conditions treated as a given,
officials struggle to find solutions that will transform every child's experience, no matter how impoverished or isolated the school. With educational administrators taking the lead in pursuing current efforts at innovation, changes are framed in terms of managerial efficiency-whether in
the way that teachers are paid and trained, principals are prepared for
leadership, or new schools are formed. Given this focus on restructuring
educational services to improve student outcomes, implementation is
accompanied by expert empirical analysis to determine whether a plan
has any meaningful impact. No longer is there room for the purely symbolic victory in educational reform. The plaintiffs in Keyes could claim
the moral high ground, even though many everyday problems in the
schools were unresolved. Today's gains, by contrast, must be tangible
and measurable. By that metric, progress remains elusive.

